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PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AFTER CIPOLLONE - NEVADA SUPREME
COURT HOLDS THAT THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND
RODENTICIDE ACT IMPLIEDLY PREEMPTS STATE COMMON-LAW AC-
TIONS BASED ON INADEQUATE LABELING. - Davidson v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 836 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992).
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,' the Supreme Court held that
the express preemption provision of the Public Health Cigarette Smok-
ing Act of 1969 (1969 Cigarette Act)2 bars all state tort claims against
cigarette manufacturers based on the inadequacy of federally-man-
dated labeling. 3 The Court further held that this preemption provision
also precluded judicial inquiry into any implied federal preemption of
state law.4 The issue of preemption s of state product liability actions
is not unique to the cigarette industry; numerous other products are
also subject to federal statutes containing preemption provisions. 6
Prior to Cipollone, the circuits were divided over whether the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act's (FIFRA) label-
ing preemption provision7 impliedly preempted state tort actions for
inadequate labeling. 8 Under FIFRA, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has the authority to approve pesticide warning labels
based on data submitted by the manufacturer. 9 The EPA has pro-
mulgated, pursuant to FIFRA, comprehensive regulations regarding
the content, placement, type, size, and prominence of warnings and
instructions on pesticide labels. 10 FIFRA permits the states to regulate
1 12 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988). Section 5(b) of the i969 Cigarette Act provides that "[n]o
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with
respect to the advertisement or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are [lawfully]
labeled." Id.
3 See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625. A majority of the Court concluded that the phrase "no
requirement or prohibition" in the 1969 Cigarette Act encompasses "obligations that take the
form of common law rules," and therefore, that § 5(b) preempted state tort claims regarding
labeling. Id.
4 See id. at 2620.
5 The preemption of state law results from the constitutional requirement that federal law
prevails when state and federal laws conflict. State law can be preempted by federal law in
one of three ways: (i) by an express statement of Congress, see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525 (i977); (2) by implication when the structure and purpose of the federal statutory
and regulatory scheme evince a clear intent to preclude state action, see Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); or (3) through a direct conflict with a federal law,
see Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
6 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 24, 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1988);
Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988 § 205, 27 U.S.C. § 2x6 (1988).
7 7 U.S.C. § 136v.
8 See, e.g., Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1503-09 (W.D. Mo. i99i); Cox
v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
9 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(q)(i)(G), 136a.
10 See 40 C.F.R. § 156.io(a) (1992).
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the sale or use of pesticides," but it specifically provides that "[a]
State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for
labeling and packaging in addition to or different from those required
under this subchapter.' 12
In Davidson v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,13 the first post-Cipollone
state court preemption decision, the Nevada Supreme Court held that
FIFRA preempts state tort actions for inadequate labeling. However,
instead of limiting its analysis to FIFRA's express preemption provi-
sion, as Cipollone requires, the Davidson court analyzed the FIFRA
claim under an implied preemption rubric. This failure to apply
Cipollone suggests the Davidson court's confusion over Cipollone's
holding that although courts are free to consider implied preemption
in the absence of a preemption provision, they may not do so when
a statute contains expressly preemptive language. Davidson's reliance
on implied preemption also signalled its doubts about the ability of
common-law courts to identify socially optimal warning labels.
In Davidson, a homeowner brought suit against Velsicol, a pesti-
cide manufacturer, for Velsicol's failure to provide adequate warning
and appropriate labeling instructions for the application of its product
to the foundation of newly constructed residences.14 Velsicol argued
that FIFRA preempted state tort claims based on a failure adequately
to label or warn.' 5 The trial court agreed, and held that the statute
impliedly preempted inadequate labeling claims against manufacturers
of EPA-registered pesticides. 16
In analyzing whether FIFRA preempts failure-to-warn claims
against manufacturers based on inadequate labeling, the Davidson
court first announced that it did not find Cipollone instructive. 17
However, the court noted that its "opinion is consonant with Cipollone
in that [it] address[es] implied preemption only after concluding that
FIFRA does not expressly preempt such claims."' 8 Thus, the Dav-
idson court interpreted Cipollone to require courts to focus on the
scope of a statute's express preemption provision in addition to -
rather than to the exclusion of - an implied preemption analysis.
Next, the Davidson court asserted that the statute's express
preemption provision made no reference to the preemption of state
1 See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a).
12 Id.
13 834 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992).
14 See id. at 932.
Is See id.
16 See id.




common-law remedies. 19 Because Congress had expressly preempted
common-law claims in other statutes, 20 its silence in section 136v(b)
of FIFRA precluded a finding of express preemption. 21 Turning to
the question of whether Congress implicitly intended to preempt state
tort claims, the Davidson court concluded that Congress intended
section 136v(b) to preempt the entire field of pesticide labeling. 22
Relying on legislative history, the court further reasoned that it was
unlikely that Congress would have designated federal control over
labeling in section 136v(b) if it had believed that the provision could
be thwarted by state action authorized by section 136v(a).2 3 In ad-
dition, the pervasiveness of the federal regulation of pesticide labeling
created by FIFRA indicated that Congress had left no room for state
supplementation. 24
Finally, the court asked if state tort claims were impliedly
preempted because they conflicted with FIFRA.25 Under preemption
doctrine, an "actual" conflict arises when compliance with both state
and federal law is impossible or when a state law obstructs the ac-
complishment and execution of Congress's purposes and objectives. 26
Before Cipollone, some courts2 7 had held that compliance with the
requirements of both FIFRA and state tort law was not impossible
because the manufacturer had the choice of how to react to tort
liability: it could continue to use the label approved by the EPA and
at the same time pay damages to successful tort plaintiffs; alterna-
tively, the manufacturer could petition the EPA for a more compre-
hensive label. 28 Davidson rejected this "choice of reaction" analysis, 29
19 See Davidson, 834 P.2d at 934.
20 See, e.g., Domestic Housing and International Recovery and Financial Stability Act
§ 253(e), 12 U.S.C. § 175z-i8(e) (x988) (preempting any "State constitution, statute, court
decree, common law, rule, or public policy"); Copyright Act of 1976 § 3o(a)-(b), 17 U.S.C.
§ 301(a)-(b) (I988) (preempting rights "under the common law or statutes of any State").
21 See Davidson, 834 P.2d at 934.
22 See id. at 934-36.
23 See id. at 936. The Supreme Court has recognized that FIFRA does not preempt the
entire field of pesticide regulation. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, III S. Ct. 2476,
2487 (1991). Some states have exploited the tenuous distinction between regulating pesticide use
(which FIFRA does not preempt) and regulating labeling (which is preempted) by passing
legislation that requires manufacturers to provide warnings and notification through means other
than labels. See, e.g., New York State Pesticide Coalition v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115, 119-20 (2d
Cir. 1989); Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Allenby, 744 F. Supp. 934, 935 (N.D. Cal. 199o),
aff'd, 958 F.2d 941 (9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 13 S. Ct. 8o (1992).
24 See Davidson, 834 P.2d at 936.
25 See id. at 936-37.
26 See Mortier, III S. Ct. at 2482.
27 See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. io62 (1984).
28 See id.
29 See Davidson, 834 P.2d at 937.
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and agreed instead with other cases30 that had held jury damage
awards conflicted directly with FIFRA.3 1 The court reasoned that,
by registering a pesticide, the EPA has determined that the labels are
adequate, and a jury finding that a pesticide label is inadequate
directly conflicts with the EPA's determination. 32 Furthermore, state
tort actions would obstruct Congress's goal of achieving uniformity in
pesticide labeling because tort liability would compel a manufacturer
to change its label. 33
Although its ultimate finding of preemption was consistent with
Cipollone, the Davidson court ignored Cipollone's relevance to
FIFRA's labeling preemption provision and erroneously engaged in a
pre-Cipollone implied preemption analysis of the statute. The Dav-
idson court's refusal to find Cipollone instructive was manifested in
two ways.
First, the Davidson court should have relied on Cipollone to re-
solve the express preemption question. In finding express preemption,
Cipollone held that the term "requirement" - present in both the 1969
Cigarette Act and FIFRA - sweeps "broadly and suggests no dis-
tinction between positive enactments and common law."34 Therefore,
under Cipollone,35 FIFRA's prohibition against state labeling "require-
ments" in addition to those set forth by the EPA expresses a congres-
sional intent to preempt any state interference with federal regulation.
Davidson thus should have held that FIFRA expressly preempts the
tort claim at issue even though the statute's preemption provision
makes no reference to state common-law remedies.
Second, rather than restricting itself to determining whether
FIFRA's express preemption provision revealed a congressional intent
to supersede state law, the Davidson court turned to implied preemp-
tion doctrines. Only a misconstrual of the Supreme Court's preemp-
tion approach could have led the Davidson court to proclaim its
implied preemption analysis as "consonant" with Cipollone.36
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court held that "Congress' enactment
of a provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that
matters beyond that reach are not preempted. '37 The Court's un-
30 See, e.g., Arkansas-Platte & Gulf v. Van Waters & Rogers, 959 F.2d x58, 161-64 (loth
Cir.), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Cipollone).
31 See Davidson, 834 P.2d at 937.
32 See id.
3 See id.
34 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992).
35 Section V of the Cipollone opinion, which discussed the term "requirement," was a four-
Justice plurality opinion. If that opinion is read in tandem with Justice Scalia's dissent, which
Justice Thomas joined, it is clear that six Justices support the broad reading of the term. See
id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
36 See Davidson, 834 P.2d at 933 n.2.
37 Cipollone, i12 S. Ct. at 2618.
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willingness to engage in implied preemption analysis when a statute
contains an express preemption provision stems from its belief that
the most reliable indicator of what Congress intended to preempt is
what it expressly preempted in the statute.38 Thus, when an explicit
statement of preemption is present (as in FIFRA and the 1969 Ciga-
rette Act), courts should focus exclusively on the text of that state-
ment.39 By requiring that Congress bear the burden of comprehen-
siveness and clarity when it chooses to speak on preemption, Cipollone
professed to give force to the heavy presumption against displacing
state law in the face of congressional silence. 40
However, the Cipollone Court weakened this presumption, first by
finding express preemption of inadequate labeling claims despite the
failure of the 1969 Cigarette Act's preemption provision to mention
common-law actions, 41 and, second, by not limiting the ability of
courts to consider implied preemption in the absence of expressly
preemptive language. 42 Although the Davidson court clearly misin-
terpreted Cipollone's directive to confine itself to determining the scope
of the statute's preemption provision, Davidson's approach highlights
these deficiencies in the Supreme Court's holding. By failing to find
express preemption because FIFRA (like the 1969 Cigarette Act) con-
tains no mention of state common-law actions, the Davidson court
actually applied a stricter express preemption test than that adopted
38 See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (z987) (Marshall, J.)
(observing that when Congress has included an express preemption provision in a statute, "there
is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws from the substantive provisions"
of the legislation).
39 See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1140 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Burke, which
held that FIFRA expressly preempts failure-to-warn claims based on inadequate labeling, im-
plemented Cipollone's preemption principles. However, despite its recognition that Cipollone
requires courts to focus exclusively on express preemption clauses, even the Burke court did not
refrain from examining, in dicta, the manufacturer's implied preemption claims. See id. at
1141. Similarly, in Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mont. 1992), the
court found "its analysis to be consonant with" Cipollone's emphasis on express preemption
provisions only after endorsing the "choice of reaction" analysis and holding that state tort claims
would not conflict with FIFRA. See id. at i3oo-o.
40 Because preemption threatens to restrain state sovereignty, preemption analysis begins
with the assumption that the federal law does not supersede the historic police powers of the
states unless "that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 6-25, at 48o-8i (2d ed. 2988) (observing that courts' reluctance to find preemption "seems
particularly appropriate in light of the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis on the central role
of Congress in protecting the sovereignty of the states").
41 See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618-i9. For example, the Supreme Court found that the
legislative history of the 2969 Cigarette Act supported interpreting the phrase "imposed under
State law" to include common-law rules "[a]lthough the presumption against pre-emption might
give good reason to construe the phrase 'state law' in a pre-emption provision more narrowly
than an identical phrase in another context." Id.
42 See id. at 2617.
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by the Cipollone Court. Furthermore, the Davidson court's belief that
it could rely on implied preemption doctrine underscores the inconsis-
tency of Cipollone's ruling that, although courts may not use implied
preemption when Congress has included some preemptive language
in the statute, they are free to displace state remedies when Congress
is entirely silent on the preemption issue. 43
Besides expressing justifiable confusion over Cipollone's approach,
the Davidson court's implied preemption analysis may have also
masked its concern about the competence of the courts to identify
accurately an efficient label. 44 If it is likely that courts will make
mistakes in setting the standard for what constitutes a reasonable
warning label, as well as in determining whether the inadequate
labeling caused the plaintiff's harm, manufacturers will have an in-
centive to provide inefficient labels in order to escape liability.45 That
it was a state court finding federal preemption supports the idea that
the Davidson court was using preemption doctrine as a pretext to
avoid the difficult questions of judicial competence. 46 The flexibility
of an implied preemption approach offered the Davidson court the
opportunity to circumvent the problems posed by judicial error and
to defer to the superior ability of the EPA to identify socially optimal
labels.
Despite their facial differences, both Cipollone and Davidson il-
lustrate how courts, although purporting to rely upon notions of state
sovereignty, have been reluctant to constrain their ability to find
preemption. Davidson also suggests that concerns about judicial com-
petence to resolve complex problems can influence a court's preemp-
tion decision.
43 Cf. id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(criticizing the majority's rule that "[t]he statute that says anything about pre-emption must say
everything; and it must do so with great exactitude, as any ambiguity concerning its scope will
be read in favor of preserving state power").
44 For an example of an argument favoring preemption on judicial competence grounds, see
generally Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceu-
ticals, 103 HAvv. L. REV. 773, 785-93 (199o).
45 This problem of inefficiency caused by inaccurate case-by-case judicial determinations
might be resolved through the use of a strict liability standard, which would encourage manu-
facturers to take no more than reasonable care with respect to labeling. Inefficiency may also
result if manufacturers are unable to predict the point at which courts will draw the line for an
acceptable label. See Robert D. Cooter, Defective Warnings, Remote Causes, and Bankruptcy:
Comment on Schwartz, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 737, 748 (x985).
46 Davidson is not the only post-Cipollone state court decision which relied on implied
preemption principles to find federal preemption of state common law remedies with respect to
pesticide labeling. In Yowell v. Chevron Chemical Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. App. 1992), the
Missouri Court of Appeals acknowledged Cipollone but, like the Davidson court, undertook an
implied preemption analysis to conclude that FIFRA preempts state common law actions based
on inadequate labeling. See id. at 64-66.
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